How do countries smooth regional disturbances? : risksharing in Spain : 1973-1993 by Alberola Ila, Enrique & Asdrubali, Pierfederico
HOW DO COUNTRIES
SMOOTH REGIONAL
DISTURBANCES?
RISKSHARING IN
SPAIN: 1973-1993
Enrique Alberola and
Pierfederico Asdrubali
Banco de España - Servicio de Estudios
Documento de Trabajo nº 9724
HOW DO COUNTRIES 
SMOOTH REGIONAL 
DISTURBANCES? 
RISKSHARING IN 
SPAIN: 1973-1993 
Enrique Alberola and 
Pierfederico Asdrubali 
(*) We thank Isabel Argim6n, Olympia Bover, Angel Estrada, Luis Gordo, Eva Ortega. Carlos 
Torregrosa and Jose Vifials for useful discussions. Paloma G6mez and especially Jose Manuel 
Marques provided superb research assistance. E·mail: alberola@bde.es 
Banco de Espana - Servicio de Estudios 
Documento de Trabajo nQ 9724 
In publishing this series the Banco de Espana seeks to disseminate 
studies of interest that will help acquaint readers better 
with the Spanish economy. 
The analyses, opinions and findings of these papers represent 
the views of their authors; they are not necessarily those 
of the Banco de Espana. 
The Banco de Espana is disseminating some of its 
principal reports via INTERNET and INFOViA. 
The respecti�e WWW server addresses are: 
http://www.bde.es and http://www.bde.inf. 
ISSN: 0213-2710 
ISBN: 84-7793-576-9 
Oep6sito legal: M. 40199-1997 
Imprenta del Banco de Espana 
Abstract 
We use a simple analytical framework to study how idiosyncratic production shocks are smoothed 
through risksharing across Spanish provinces. By analyzing how production in the average 
province is successively smoothed until it is used as consumption, we find that half of the shocks 
have been smoothed in the period 1973-1993 and that this proportion is even higher in the last 
decade (1983-1993). Capital and credit market risksharing account for most of this result. Labor 
mechanisms play a negligible role and the smoothing due to the government tax· transfer system 
is quite small. Finally, we observe that the use of provincial prices instead of aggregate prices 
results in a reduction of the degree of smoothing in the economy. 

I. Introduction 
Regions or provinces in a country are deeply integrated through a network of eco· 
nomic links which facilitates the smoothing of idiosyncratic economic disturbances.l This 
smoothing is in part the consequence of risksharing mechanisms, deliberately or undeliber· 
ately built in the economy, that allow consumption in each period to be less volatile than 
production.:.! For instance, the national tax and transfers system may act as a "shod· 
buffer" that allows provinces (or agents in general) to receive more net transfers in case 
of a higher·than·average negative disturbance to province production. Other risk shar· 
ing mechanisms are less obvious, and will be discussed in the next section; but we will 
use a simple econometric framework for quantifying their effects in the case of Spain. In 
particular, we will be able to isolate four complementary channels of risksharing, thereby 
integrating the disperse literature on the issue. Thus we convey labor market smoothing 
(Blanchard and Katz [1992] and Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1991] for the US, Bentolila [1992] 
and Bentolila and Dolado [1991] for Spain), capital market smoothing (French and Poterba 
[1991] for the international economy and Atkeson and Bayoumi [1993] for Europe), fiscal 
smoothing (Sala·i-Martin and Sachs [1992] for the US, von Hagen [1992]' Bayoumi and 
Masson [1995], Goodhart and Smith [1993] for Europe, Ciscar [1992] for Spain), and credit 
market smoothing. We will also pursue further decomposition of the labor, fiscal and c:redit 
channels in order to better explain each mechanism. 
Finally, we will study the smoothing role of provincial prices, \"hich - to our knowledge 
- had never been quantified before. 
Our framework - based on Asdrubali, S!iSrensen and Yosha [1996] - will be applied 
to the Spanish case for the period 1973-1993. During this time, the Spanish economy has 
gone through a thorough transformation: the economic transition from a primary economy 
to an economy of services with more developed financial markets; the return of migration 
which fled to Europe in the previous decades, and the dramatic upsurge in unemployment. 
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But the most characteristic feature of Spain is that it has moved from an authoritarian 
regime to a democracYi this change has brought about the shift from a paternalistic state 
towards a western-style welfare state, and from a very centralist administrative structure 
to the current decentralized configuration. 
Presumably, these changes have had a deep impact on the channels of risksharing. Thus, 
we would like to explore not only the degree of income and consumption smoothing across 
Spain, or the importance of the fiscal channel relative to market institutions, but also how 
they have evolved over time. To shed. light on these issues, we study the patterns of risk 
sharing among Spanish provinces during the period 1973-1993, and then we repeat the 
analysis, separating the periods 1973-1983 and 1983-1993. The first roughly corresponds 
to the so called transition to democracy, from the first oil shock and the demise of Franco's 
regime to the consolidation of democracy after the failed coup in 1981 and the change 
in Government in 1982. The second period corresponds to the consolidation of the new 
economic and political structure, in which the Spanish economy becomes wholly inserted 
in the developed world and joins the European Union (1986). 
Our results show that labor market smoothing has been very modest in either sub­
period, suggesting that internal migrations have played a minor stabilizing role. On the 
contrary, capital markets have been a very relevant source of risksharing, reflecting a re­
markable degree of financial integration within the country. Government smoothing is also 
small, although in the second period its importance has greatly increased, reflecting the 
deep changes in the structure of fiscal mechanisms. Investigating further into the fiscal com­
ponents, we observe that the sizable stabilizing effects of transfers have been marginally 
reversed by government receipts. The role of credit markets also turns out to be very 
relevant, although in this case we are unable to discriminate between interprovincial and 
intertemporai effects. Finally, we isolate the role of provincial prices in smoothing shocks; 
interestingly enough, they appear to have had a dis-smoothing effect. 
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All in all we find that risksharing - predominantly through capital and credit markets 
- has allowed to absorb half of the disturbances to production in the period under consid­
eration, and that its role has significantly improved in the last decade. Our finding of less 
than full risksharing is consistent with theoretical studies on the optimality of incomplete 
government risksharing (e.g. Asdrubali [1996]), as well as with empirical work on consump­
tion smoothing in the United States (e.g. Cochrane [1991] and Crucini [1995]; see however 
Mace [1991]), in Spain (Cutanda [1995]) and with evidence of less than full risksharing in 
village India (Townsend [1994]), 
In the next section we present the main idea of risksharing channels, in section III 
we illustrate the main variance decomposition, and discuss measurement and econometric 
issues. In section IV we present the results, and section V concludes. 
II. Channels of risksharing 
There are several channels through which risk sharing can occur across different provinces. 
First, economic agents residing in a province can move to other provinces, either temporar­
ily or permanently. In so doing, they diversify their income sources. To the same purpose, 
they can share their provincial risk via cross-ownership of productive assets in capital 
markets. Third, their income can be further smoothed by the tax-transfer system of the 
central government. Fourth, they may smooth their consumption by adjusting their asset 
portfolio, as long as national credit markets are well developed; that is, they can lend to 
and borrow from other provinces. For brevity we label these leyels of smoothing as labor 
market, capital market, central government (or fiscal), and credit market smoothing. 
Let ap, rp, ri, di, and c denote net autarkic province product, net resident province 
product, province resident income, disposable province income, and province consumption, 
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all in real per capita terms. Table I displays a scheme of the stage at which each risksharing 
mechanism operates in the economy. Net autarkic province product, ap, is the value added 
to production of the province (net of depreciation) as if there were no migration flows. 
Net resident province product, rp, includes both net migration and commuters' income, 
thereby accounting for the effects on production of labor mobility. Province resident in­
come, ri, includes dividend, interest, and rental income payments across province borders; 
disposable province income, di, includes transfers and is net of income taxes (personal and 
corporate) and of social security contributions; finally c is a measure of provincial private 
consumption. See the Appendix for a discussion on data construction. 
If there is full risk sharing after labor mobility smoothing, rp should not comove with 
ap. If full risksharing is not achieved, there is scope for capital market smoothing, which 
will take place to the extent that ri does not comove with rp (or, alternatively, to the 
extent that (rp - ri) comoves with ap). If full risk sharing is not yet achieved, there is 
scope for further income smoothing by the central tax-transfer system. If full risksharing is 
achieved at this level, di should not comove with ap. Otherwise, there is scope for further 
consumption smoothing on asset markets. If full interprovince risksharing is achieved after 
all the channels of smoothing have operated, c will not vary with ap for a given level of 
aggregate output. 
III. A Metric for Risksharing 
In order to assess more formally the degree of risk sharing, in this section we develop 
a framework to measure the percentage of a shock absorbed at each level of smoothing. 
Before presenting it, a caveat is in order. Two dimensions of risksb.aring are implicit in 
our analysis: a spatial (interprovincial) and a time (intertemporal) dimension. This work 
is centered on the former, and our metric provides the means to abstract from the latter, 
but the nature of some variables in our data set renders difficult to do it neatly at each 
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level of risksharing) in particular in the credit channel, as we will observe below. 
vVe regard the output (per capita) of each province as exogenous, and treat province 
production as a homogeneous non-durable good, so our analysis ignores capital as well as 
capital gains and losses. With full risksharing, consumption in each province is a fixed 
proportion of aggregate output, independently of the nature of the stochastic process gov­
erning shocks to province production.3 
Although testing for full risksharing is implicit in our methodology, our main objective 
is to break down the observed risksharing (whether full or not) into its components. Such 
decomposition of the period by period cross-sectional variance in province production will 
provide a metric for quantifying risksharing at each level of smoothing. Consider the 
identity 
. api rp� ri di-
ci, (1 ) ap*= -. 1'1" ",' d,' c' 
where i is an index of provinces and the time index has been dropped for simplicity. 
Smoothing takes place via labor 
!!J!'. !E credit markets if rp' ' d ' 
mobility, capital markets, the tax-transfer system, and 
d:: and �� vary positively with api, namely if 
an increase in api entails a smaller increase in r/, which in turn entails an even smaller 
increase iri n\ and so forth. 
If we take logs and differences, multiply both sides by � log api and apply the expecta-
tion operator, we will obtain the following decomposit.ion of the cross-sectional variance in 
ap growth: 
var{ t> log ap} cov{t> log ap, t> log ap - t>log rp} 
+ cov{ t> log ap, t> log rp - t> log ri} 
+ cov{t> log ap, t> log ri - t> log di} 
+ cov{t> log ap, t> log di - t> log c} 
+ cov{t> log ap, t> loge} . 
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Diyide by the \-ariance of 6. log ap to get 
(2) = Ih + I]" + Pc + Pc + Pl', 
where Ih is the ordinary least squa.res (OLS) estima.te of the slope in the regression of 
.0. log api - 6. log .,..l on .3. log a/. /3,.; is the slope in the regression of 6. log 1'/ - � log ri 
on 6. log api _ PG is the slope in the regression of u log r/; - 6. log dt" on tJ.log api, Pc is the 
slope in the regression of 610g dit - tJ.log ci on ulog api, and 13u is the coefficient in the 
regression of 6. log ci on 6.. log api. We interpret Ih, 131\, 13G, a.nd 13c as the percentage of 
smoothing achieved at each level. and f3u as the amount not smoothed_ If i3u =:; 0, there 
is full risksharing and the coefficients 13L, i3",-, i3G, and f3c sum to 1. Otherwise, they sum 
to less than 1. We do not constrain any of the f3 coefficients, at any level. to be positive 
or less than]. Therefore, if there is dis-smoothing at some level, it will be reflected in a 
negative value of 11. In the next section_ we explain how we proceed to estimatE' the /3s. 
Together with the labor market, capital market and credit market smoothing consti­
tutes the fraction of shocks smoothed through transactions on markets. An important 
distinction between these forms of smoothing is that capital market smoothing is a re­
sult of ex-ante arrangements, prior to the occurrence of shocks, whereas credit market 
smoothing takes place ex-post, after shocks occur. Finally, we must point out that t.he 
credit market smoothing has both an interprovincial and an intertemporal component: it 
is obvious that economic agents can smooth their consumption either by borrO\�ing and 
lending from other provinces or by accumulating and decumulating wealth through savingj 
therefore, our consumption data also incorporate intertemporal smoothing effects. Lack of 
data on saving flows prevent us from filtering them out. 
Econometric Issues 
At the practical level, we apply the decomposition in (2) by running the panel regres-
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regressions 
6. log ap: - 6. log rp; VL,t + Ih 6. log ap� + ULt, 
(3) 6. log rp: - 6. log n� VK,t + f3K 6. log ap; + Ukt 
6. log rl� - .6. log dl� = VG,! + f3c 6. log ap; + ; uG,t, 
Ll.log d� - Ll.log c; Ve,t + f3c Ll.log ap; + ; Ite,t , 
6. log c; VU,t + f3u Ll.log ap; + U�,t ' 
where V.,t are time fixed effects. The {3 coefficients will then be weighted averages of the 
year by year cross-sectional regressions.4 The time fixed effects capture year specific im­
pacts on growth rates, most notably the impact of the growth in Net Domestic Product. 
This will allow us to interpret the {3s as the amount of smoothing of asymmetric shocks 
achieved domestically. Using these equations we measure the degree to which changes in 
ap affect, e.g., same year province consumption. 
It is well known since the work of Nelson and Plosser [1982J that most macroeco­
nomic time series exhibit unit root or near unit root behavior, and that time series re-
gressions involving unit root processes ma.y give results that a.re spurious in the sense of 
Granger and Newbold [1974J and Phillips [1986J. The time series in our data set are clearly 
best characterized as unit root processes and the time differenced specification is therefore 
appropriate.5 The autocorrelation that would be induced by differencing a stationary se­
ries will in any case entail loss of efficiency, but not bias. Given the large cross-sectional 
dimension of the data set, this potential loss of efficiency is not serious. Further autocor­
relation in each equation has turned out to be negligible. 
Preliminary estimations suggest that our data exhibit a certain degree of heteroskedas­
ticity, since the variance over time of each series fluctuates across provinces. The problem 
is partly reduced because we take logs of the variables, and successively deflate each of 
them by province population - obtaining per capita measures - as well as by province 
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cpi - obtaining real measures. In order to further reduce potential effects of heteroskedas­
ticity and to guard against outliers, we estimated the relations (one by one) running Huber 
(robust) regressions which assign lower weight to observations with higher absolute resid­
uals, and drop outliers altogether. We then estimated the corrected equations in (??) as 
SUR regressions. We adopted the same tecnique for the detailed panels in Tables III to VII.6 
Since province level data may be measured with less precision than aggregate data, one 
may worry about measurement errors. The errors arise because some of the data used 
for constructing our variables are imprecise (see Appendix for details). It is well known 
that measurement errors in the regressor bias the estimates towards zero, while measure­
ment errors in the regressand only lead to increased standard errors. The regressor, ap, is 
particularly likely to be measured with error for small provinces. To the extent that our c0-
efficients are biased we would overstate the amount of labor market smoothing (since Ih is 
one minus the regression of � log rp on 610g ap) and understate the amount not smoothed. 
Potential bias in our estimates of capital, government and credit market smoothing may 
be positive or negative since, for example, {3G is the difference of the regression coefficients 
of � log ri and 6. log di on 610g ap. Over longer horizons measurement errors are likely to 
be less serious.7 
It should be kept in mind that measurement errors in consumption, as in any left 
hand side variable, do not result in biased estimates, only in higher standard deviations. 
However, our estimates of the fraction of shocks to province product not smoothed, f3u. 
exhibit standard deviations that are low enough to enhance our confidence in the main 
results. 
IV. Results 
In Table II we display the empirical results. Our breakdown shows that a considerable 
part of shocks to province output (22.5 percent) is absorbed by capital market smoothing. 
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We interpret this as a consequence of cross-ownership of capital, which reflects the financial 
integration between Spanish provinces. 
The amount of smoothing accomplished by the labor market is 2.3 percent and is 
statistically significant. The small value offh is consistent with all the studies on migration 
in Spain (e.g., Bentolila [1992] and Bentolila and Dolado [1991]), which have underlined 
the negligible stabilizing role of labour mobility. 
More intriguing is the scant risksharing effect of fiscal policy (2.5 percent), although 
this result is consistent with the study of Ciscar [1992]. Indeed, the central tax-transfer 
system is not primarily intended to provide interprovincial risksharingj rather, stabilization 
is expected to occur mostly intertemporally, through the government's fiscal deficits or 
surpluses. However, we would have expected that the existence of automatic stabilizers 
and the redistributive role of fiscal mechanisms would have played an important role as a 
regional risksharing mechanism. We wi1l turn to this point later. 
The degree of smoothing at the last level, which we refer to as credit market smooth­
ing, amounts to 23.3 percent. As we have mentioned, we cannot discriminate which is the 
contribution of interregional and intertemporai smoothing to this percentage. 
Proba.bly the most outstanding result is the importance of market mechanisms as op­
posed to the role of government. While the economy is able to stabilize roughly a half 
(50.8%) of any shock, the contribution of fiscal mechanisms to stabilization is meagre. 
Sub-Periods 
Two interesting related questions are whether these smoothing channels have changed 
over time, and whether more smoothing would have been undertaken by private markets 
had there been less government smoothing. One way of getting an indication of this is to 
see if the amount of government smoothing has varied over sub-periods and if the amount 
of market smoothing has varied correspondingly. As the time series dimension of our data 
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set is rather short (20 years of data, corresponding to eleven observations of differenced 
data, since the frequency is biannual), we chose to split it into two sub-periods, 1973-1983 
and 1983-1993. 
The results are reported in Table III. Smoothing due to labor mobility took place 
mainly in the seventies and declined in the following period. Capital market and, to 
a lesser extent, credit market smoothing increased considerably from one decade to the 
next reflecting, most probably, financial innovation and better access to securities markets. 
During the period 1983-93 almost 30% of a shock to province output was smoothed on 
capital markets, and roughly a quarter on credit markets. Government smoothing in the 
first period turns out not to be significant, while it improves dramatically (to 7.5%) in the 
second period, reflecting the deep changes in the fiscal mechanism, brought about in part 
by more western-style welfare state features. 
Capital and credit markets smoothing on one hand, and fiscal smoothing on the other 
seem therefore to have moved together during the past decades, with no indication that one 
is a. substitute for the other. However, capital market smoothing turns out to be the main 
channel in the second period, while credit market smoothing ranks first in the first period. 
Since credit market smoothing merges intertemporal and interregional mechanisms, we can 
infer that the capital market channel has probably been the most important mechanism of 
risksharing in the Spanish economy. 
All in all our results show that the percentage of smoothing has increased dramati­
cally between periods (from 43.3% to 63.3%); all the mechanisms but labour mobility have 
improved reflecting a definite gain in the capability of the country to absorb domestic 
idiosyncratic shocks. However, we still largely reject the hypothesis of full interprovince 
risksharing. This finding is consistent with most of the existing literature. 
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Detailed Breakdown 
Further insights on the relative role of risksharing channels, overall and over time, can 
be gained by breaking down, when data permit, each channel of smoothing into its compo­
nents. The procedure is the same as above, where we let the real rate of growth of autarkic 
product be the common regressor; but now we use as regressands the rate of growth of 
the components of each level of smoothing. The results for the estimation of the betas 
corresponding to each component of labor, fiscal and credit markets smoothing appear in 
Tables IV, V and VI, respectively. 
Table IV shows that labour smoothing has been achieved essentially through migration 
and that commuters' income has played no significant role. The results do not vary much 
between periods. 
Quite instructive is the analysis of fiscal smoothing in Table Vj the risksharing effect of 
government policy has exclusively relied upon transfers (almost 5%), while the rest of the 
components {social security contributions, personal income taxes and corporate taxes} have 
contributed negatively, albeit scantly. These results conform with those of Ciscar [1992], 
who however adopts a different methodology. When we turn to the sub-period analysis, 
the results are even more informative. In the first period, transfers play a minor smoothing 
role (2.7%), while - interestingly enough - the other components display a dis-smoothing 
effect (only personal income taxes are non significant). Second period transfers, instead, are 
able to smooth a round 10% of a shock, and only corporate taxes keep showing a significant 
negative sign. Behind this differential role of transfers may lay the shift of importance in 
the type of fiscal mechanisms adopted by the government, from pensions in the seventies 
to more standard unemployment subsidies in the eighties. As for personal income taxes, 
their behaviour can be defined as neutral, given their low value in any sample and lack of 
significance in the sub-period analysis.s 
Finally, a decomposition of the sources of credit smoothing suggests that while house­
hold savings have greatly increased their already relevant role, on the contrary corporate 
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savings (i.e., retained earnings) exhibit. if anything, a dis-smoothing effect, although it is 
not significant in the second period. 
The Smoothing Role of Prices 
The price level across provinces may interact with risk sharing patterns. There are 
sound theoretical reasons to expect both a smoothing and a dis-smoothing effect of provin­
cial prices. Centering the discussion on relative supply shocks, as we have done up to 
now, open-economies real exchange rate models, as Obstfeld's [1985], suggest that positive 
productivity shocks create an excess supply which reduces relative pricesj on the con­
trary. when differences between exposed and non-exposed sectors are considered, as in the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, positive productivity shocks, which mainly benefit expoBed 
(tradables) sectors, result in relative price increases. To investigate the issue for the case 
of Spain, we started by running the same panel regressions as in (:3). but deflating the 
variables by national cpi'(denoted P,) rather than by provincial cpi (1);), This amounts t.o 
repeating the previous exercise without taking into account the effects of provincial prices. 
It is convenient to rewrite that system in terms of nominal rates of growth (upper case 
variables) minus national inRation: 
I'> log AP' - I'> log RP. IIL,t + (3, (I'> log AP' - I'> log P,)+ �L ' 
(4) I'> log RP, - I'> log Rr, 1Ik-,t + (3j, (I'> log AP, - I'> log P,) + 71�·,t , 
I'> log Rr. - I'> log Dr. 1I(;,t + (3;; (1'>IogAp' - I'> log P,) + ; 71G,1 , 
I'> log Dr. - I'> log C, lie,! + (32: (I'> log AP' - I'> log P,) + 7J�',! , 
I'> log C, - I'> log P, = IIU,t + (3;; (I'> log AP' - I'> log P,) + 'l�" , 
where f3.� and 1I.�t are, respectively, the corresponding smoothing coefficients and time 
fixed effects. Table VlI shows the results for the whole sample (the sub-period analysis 
displays a similar profile). Using a common deflator now increases smoothing at every levd; 
-16-
as a consequence the percentage not smoothed decreases from 49.2% to 39.5%, suggest­
ing that using provincial prices instead of aggregate prices reduces smoothing at every level. 
We would like to test this hypothesis more formally. The left-hand terms in (3) and (4) 
are equal. Operating on the right-hand terms and performing some simple manipulations, 
we arrive at a system of regressions of the following type:9 
(5) 
h �; I-�"I d 11,-11; f L K Fe d �U ,-�U.I l1i,-l1u f th w ere J.'t = 11, an 'Y = 11, or y = , , , ; an J1.t = 1-l1u ,,",( =: l-lJu or e 
last equation. 
Note that a positive '"'( implies that f3; < f3/1 and f3ij > Pu , that is, that provincial prices 
have - across the four smoothing channels - a smoothing effect. Thus, by performing a 
single regression and testing the sign and significance of the coefficient we can check our 
hypothesis. 
The result of this regression appears in the last row of Table VII; the negative sign 
and large significance of the parameter '"'( robustly confirms that provincial prices have 
played a. dis-smoothing role.10. Note that expression (5) picks up the correlation between 
relative prices and relative output, and that this correlation is negative. This result is 
consistent with models like Obstfeld and rejects the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis at the 
provincial level, which is not striking given the high level economic integration among 
Spanish provinces 11 . 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Several interesting findings emerge from the analysis. 
First, in the period under consideration there has been a considerable amount of overall 
risksharing, predominantly via capital and credit markets (almost half of the shocks to 
province product are smoothed via these channels). 
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Second, fiscal policy smoothes only a small part 
I
f shocks to province product; but 
this is the result of the countervailing forces of taxes d social security contributions as 
opposed to transfers. 
Third, the capability of the Spanish economy to s ooth shocks has greatly increased 
in the last decade. 
Fourth, while risk sharing through labor mobility 5 inevitably small, such a form of 
smoothing has lost importance in the ei�hties VS. the rventies; on the contrary, the fiscal 
and capital risksharing mechanisms have greatly impr ed their role. 
Fifth, the increased role of credit market smoothi g is due exclusively to household 
savings, rather than corporate savings. 
Finally, the use of provincial prices instead of ag regate prices reduces the level of 
smoothing in the economy, suggesting that prices play dis-smoothing role. 
The analysis leaves many interesting issues open and some intriguing questions for fur­
ther research. How much of the smoothing is achieved via inter-regional cross-ownership on 
organized stock markets, and what is the role of intermediaries in promoting interprovince 
income and consumption smoothing? Why is fiscal risksharing so small and some of its 
components dubious, while its theoretical effect ,should be unambiguous? Why do retained 
earnings appear to be countercyclical? What are the mechanisms behind the dis-smoothing 
role of relative prices? Clearly, there is need for more work on these issues. 
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Appendix: Data Construction 
We describe the main sources of data and the methodology for constructing the various 
measures of smoothing. The biannual data are taken from B.B.V. (various issues), with the 
exception of the national and provincial cpi deflators, and the regional consumption series, 
which are published in I.N.E. (various issues). The provincial measures we construct are 
all in real per capita terms. 
net autarkic product (ap): It is defined as the net "value added" of the industries of the 
province,12 net of immigration, at cost of factors. We take the gross province product, 
and we subtract capital depreciation, since only net production is already available for 
consumption by the population of the province.13 As all our measures are in per capita 
terms, we then divide the net province product by the province population short of the 
net migration of the period. We obtain therefore a "net of immigration", or "autarkic" 
product. 
resident product (rp): It is defined as the net per capita value added, including net migra­
tion and commuters' income. 
resident income (ri): Defined as the sum of earnings (wages and proprietors income) and 
'distributed profits (including interest and rent) of residents of the province. Resident 
income equals net resident product plus net capital income. The resulting number is 
(ceteris paribus) what would have been available for consumption by the residents of the 
province had there been no fiscal intervention on the part of the central government. 
disposable income (di): Defined as resident income plus central direct transfers to individ­
uals in the province (e.g. social security), minus total central taxes raised in the province 
(including social security contributions). 
consumption (c) : Consists of consumption of private goods by the residents of the province. 
There are no series on consumption available at provincial level (only at regional level from 
1981 on), so taxes on consumption were used as a proxy.14 Provincial shares in consump-
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tion taxes were used as weights in national (or regional when available) consumption. How­
e\·er, since consumption tax payments are biased by the location of (nationwide) firms, we 
previously correct.ed for this 'location bias'. controlling for the consistency between provin­
cial shares in consumption taxes and in familiar disposable income (the closest magnitude 
to consumption which we have in our B.B.V. database). Such a procedure, if anything, 
would underestimate the amount of smoothing due to the credit channel. Such a bias, how­
ever, is likely to be negligible, because the provincial shares we recovered correspond very 
closely to the shares one would obtain for provincial consumption by using VAT revenues, 
by province. 
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Endnotes 
1. The body of literature that stresses this point from the �erspective of modern 
dynamic macroeconomics is extensive. For a few references, including the difference 
between international and interregional smoothing, see Obstfeld and Rogoff [1996, 
chaps. 2, 5 and 6]. Empirical tests of full consumption smoothing or risksharing 
include - among others - Cochrane [1991[, Mace [1991[, Obstfeld [1994[, Crucini 
[1995J, Canova and Ravn [1996J, Townsend [1994J and the references in Lewis [1996J. 
Most of these papers will be referenced below. 
2. Other smoothing mechanisms include intertemporal smoothing (for example 
through accumulated domestic wealth) and redistribution (which does not involve 
sharing of idiosyncratic short-term risks). 
3. For detailed derivations of similar results, see e.g. Huang and Litzenberger [1988, 
chap. 5J, Cochrane [1991]' Attanasio and Davis [1996J, Townsend [1994J. In most of 
our analysis we regard Spain as a closed economy, that is, we ignore all forms of 
international risksharing. If the central government borrows abroad and spends the 
money on transfers or grants to provinces, the resulting smoothing will be picked up 
as part of our measure of fiscal smoothing. If individual provinces (or citizens) borrow 
an� lend internationally, our methodology will attribute the resulting smoothing to 
consumption smoothing. The consensus in the literature that there is very little 
international risksharing suggests that this is not a serious omission. 
4. A typical coefficient of the time fixed effect regression is 
by = EtEi(ap: - apt)y:/EtEi(ap� - apt)2, where y is a left hand side variable, and apt 
is average ap across provinces in period t. In a cross-sectional regression for period 
t, by,t = Ei( ap� - apt)yUEi( ap� - aPt)2. Thus, by is a weighted average of the by,t 
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coefficients with weights Ei(ap�-apc)2/EcE;(ap:-apj)2. The Least Squares estimator 
gives higher weight to years with larger cross-sectional variation in the regressor since 
they are more informative about risksharing. 
5. We performed unit root tests on the series according to the methodology devel-
oped in Levin and Lin [1992]. 
6. This estimation tecnique is based on the weighting procedure suggested by Li 
[1985], which applies Huber weights until convergence and then uses bi-weights to deal 
with severe outliers. Asymptotically correct standard errors are calculated following 
Street, Carroll and Ruppert [1988]. 
Since the equations were corrected one by one, the coefficients in the SUR estimations 
of Tables II and III did not always sum exactly to 1, and those of the detailed Tables 
IV, V and VI did not sum to the value of the corresponding aggregate coefficient. We 
corrected for these minor imprecisions by rescaling the coefficients. An alternative 
solution, which would yield a sum of coefficients equal to one, would have been 
correcting for heteroskedasticity by using the same weights for all the equations; as 
it turns out, however, such correction - which changes slightly the results - does 
not reduce heteroskedasticity significantly. 
7. Measurement errors due to misallocation of production to calendar year will be 
smaller, random i.i.d. measurement errors will tend to cancel out, and errors due to 
interpolation will become less severe. 
8. Although - as we have underlined above - the main aim of the tax-transfer 
system may be redistribution rather than stabilization, it is nonetheless interesting to 
compare our results with the degree of progressivity and redistributive role of these 
mechanisms. The progressivity of transfers (Pazos and Salas [1996}) matches with 
its smoothing effect and the regressivity of social contributions (Manresa, Calonge 
and Berenguer [1996]) with its marginal dis-smoothing. However, the progressivity 
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of the IRPF (Spanish main personal income tax, see Argim6n and Marin [1989]) does 
not fit with our results. VIe must stress though that shocks; furthermore, and also 
for this reason, the transfers which typically several factors might account for this 
discrepancy. If financial income in Spain is highly volatile as in the U.S. (Mankiw and 
Zeldes [1991]), then income tax progressivity only increases the variance of disposable 
income, to the extent that stockholders belong to high income households. 
9. The regressions in (4), although of intuitive meaning, are not explicitly based on 
a variance decomposition such as (3). Yet their difference with (3) indeed originates 
equations like (5) that measure directly the smoothing effect of provincial prices. 
10. The test is effectively assessing whether � -=J:. 1. An estimate of i = -0.107 
corresponds to an estimate of � = 1.107. Since {3y is robustly positive for all ys, our 
test states that /3; is also positive and significantly larger. 
11. This result is confirmed by both panel and time series regressions of prices on 
production, and vice versa, which always generate for Spain strongly negative (and 
significant) coefficients. 
12. Namely, sales or receipts plus inventory change minus consumption of goods and 
services purchased from other industries or imported from other provinces. 
13. We only deal with altocative risksharing, that is with the smoothing that can 
be achieved after production has taken place. We leave the analysis of production 
risksharing to further research. 
14. This series was constructed by Jose Manuel Marques with the data provided by 
Agencia Tributaria. 
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Table I: Channels of Risksharing 
LABOR MARKET SMOOTHING __ _ 
(net migration) 
(net commuters' income) 
CAPITAL MARKET SMOOTHING--­
(net capital income) 
FISCAL SMOOTHING 
(taxes and contributions) 
(transfers) 
CREDIT MARKET SMOOTHING 
(personal saving) 
(corporate saving) 
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Autarkic Product (ap) 
Resident Product (rp) 
Resident Income (ri) 
Disposable Income (di) 
Consumption (c) 
Table II: Income and Consumption Smoothing (%) - Whole Sample 
1973-1993 
Labor markets (lh) 2.3 
(4.2) 
Capital markets (11K) 22.5 
(11.0) 
Government (I1G) 2.5 
(2.2) 
Credit markets (Pc) 23.3 
(3.9) 
Not smoothed (l1u) 49.2 
(9.4) 
Percentages of shocks to province product absorbed at each level of smoothing. t-values in brack­
ets. Ih is the estimate of the slope in the regression of 6 log api - .6. log rpi on .6. log api, 13K is 
the slope in the regression of 6. log rpi - 610g n; on 6. log ap;, Po is the slope in the regression of 
.6. log n"1 -.6. log dl; on A log api, Pc is the slope in the regression of .6. log dii - 610g d on .6. log api. 
and Pu is the coefficient in the regression of .6.1ogci on .6.1ogapi. We interpret fh, 13K. i3G. and 
f3c as the incremental a.mount of smoothing achieved at each level, and Pu as the amount not 
smoothed. 
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Table III: Income and Consumption Smoothing (%) - Sub-Periods 
1973-1983 1983-1993 
Labor markets (Ih) 2.7 1.6 
(3.2) (2.1) 
Capital markets (13K) 18.3 29.5 
(7.7) (8.4) 
Government ({3G) 1.2 7.5 
(1.1) (2.8) 
Credit markets ({3c) 21.2 24.8 
(2.8) (4.2) 
Not smoothed ({3u) 56.7 36.7 
(8.6) (3.8) 
Percentages of shocks to province product absorbed at each level of smoothing for two sub�periods. 
t·values in brackets. 13£ is the estima.te of the slope in the regression of .6.1ogai - li log '1i on 
!:lIog api, f3K is the slope in the regression of .6. log rpi - .6. log n; on ,6, log api, f3G is the slope in the 
regression of .6. log n' - .6. log dii on .6. log ap', f3c is the slope in the regression of .6. log di - .6. log ci 
on ,6, log api, and /3u is the coefficient in the regression of A log ci on .6. log api. 
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Table IV: Components of Labor Market Smoothing (%) - Whole Sample and Sub· Periods 
whole sample 1973-1983 1983-1993 
Migration 1.4 1.3 l.l 
(5.0) (2.9) (4.4) 
Commuters' Income 0.9 1.4 0.5 
( 1.6) (1.5) (1.7) 
Total Labor Market Smoothing ((h) 2.3 2.7 1.6 
Percenta.ges of shocks to province product a.bsorbed a.t each level of labor market smoothing 
for the whole sample as well as for two sub-periods. t-values in brackets. The estimates are 
obtained from a regression of 6 log api - .6.1og( rpi + xi) on Lllog api, where x is a generic variable 
representing each of the above components. The estimates are interpreted as the incremental 
amount of smoothing achieved by each component. 
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Table V: Components of Fiscal Smoothing (%) - Whole Sample and Sub-Periods 
whole sample 1973-1983 1983-1993 
Transfers 4.9 2.7 9.5 
(12.8) (9.1) (9.0) 
Social Security Contributions -0.8 -0.8 -0.4 
(-2.4) (-3.7) (-0.3) 
Personal Income Taxes -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 
(-2.3) (-0.8) (-0.3) 
Corporate Incorpe Taxes -1.0 -0.5 -1.3 
(-6.0) (-5.2) (-2.3) 
Total Government Smoothing 2.5 1.2 7.5 
Percentages of shocks to province product absorbed at each level of fiscal smoothing for the whole 
sample as well as for two sub-periods. t-values in brackets. The estimates are obtained from a. 
regression of � log api - .6.1og( rti + xi} on 6. log apo. where x is a generic variable representing each 
of the above components. The estimates are interpreted as the incremental amount of smoothing 
achieved by each component. 
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Table VI: Components of Credit Market Smoothing (%) - Whole Sample and Sub-Periods 
whole sample 1975-1983 1983-1993 
Corporate Savings -1.4 -1.7 -1.2 
(-3.6) (-3.5) (-1.5) 
Household Savings 24.7 22.9 25.9 
(4.2) (2.6) (2.4) 
Total Credit Smoothing 23.3 21.1 24.8 
Percentages of shocks to province product absorbed at each level of credit market smoothing 
for the whole sample as well as for two sub-periods. t-values in brackets. The estimates are 
obtained from a regression of � log api - 6.1og( d,� + Xi) on 6 log api I where x is a generic variable 
representing each of the above components. The estimates are interpreted as the incremental 
amount of smoothing achieved by each component. 
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Table VII: Smoothing effects of provincial prices - Whole Sample 
1973-1993 
Labor markets (lh) 2.4 
(3.8) 
Capital markets (13K) 28.7 
(13.5) 
Government (f3G) 3.0 
(2.3) 
Credit markets (f3e) 25.2 
(3.8) 
Not smoothed (f3u) 40.7 
(9.4) 
Test: '"1 in (5) -10.7 
(-6.7) 
Percentages of shocks to province product absorbed at each level of smoothing, using national 
prices as common deflator. t-values in brackets. The last line reports the estimate of the param­
eter IU in the regression of .D.. log F1 - .D.. log P on .D.. log at. A significant negative value of the 
parameter imply a dis-smoothing effect of relatIve prices. 
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